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Game-theoretic fisheries models typically consider cases where some players 
harvest a single common fish stock. It is, however, the case that these types of 
models do not capture many real world mixed fisheries, where species are bio-
logical independent or dependent. The present paper considers cases where sev-
eral non-cooperative exploiters are involved in mixed fisheries. This paper is 
targeting biodiversity preservation by setting up a two species model with the 
aim of ensuring both species survive harvesting of exploiters adapting a non-
cooperative behaviour. The model starts out as a multi-species model without 
biological dependency and is then modified to include also biological depend-
ency. We contribute to the literature by analytically finding the limits on the 
number of players preserving both species including the conditions to be satis-
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1.  Introduction 
Game-theoretic fisheries models typically consider cases where some limited 
number of countries harvest a single common fish stock. In real world fisheries, 
countries does, however, often exploit several stocks simultaneously in mixed 
fisheries where the stocks may or may not be biologically dependent. This pa-
per seeks to analyse the biodiversity preservation with the aim of avoiding ex-
tinction of the species when non-cooperative exploiters harvest in a multi-
species fisheries.  
 
Hannesson (1983) presented a general multi-species model with interdependent 
fish species and studied optimal exploitation of two-species predator-prey fish-
eries. He examined how the optimal exploitation in a Lotka-Volterra type of 
model with costless harvesting and the impact on the optimal exploitation of in-
creasing discount rate. Mesterton-Gibbons (1988) investigates the optimal pol-
icy in a theoretical setting for combining harvesting of predator-prey. Fischer 
and Mirman (1996) have studied strategic interaction in multi-species fisheries 
also in a theoretical model, whereas Sumaila (1997) has studied the case of 
Barents Sea fisheries. Many of these papers have investigated the optimal poli-
cies, corresponding to the joint action by the exploiters of the multi-species. 
From traditional game theoretical analysis of single species fisheries, we know 
that, full cooperation may be hard to achieve due to free-rider incentives (Kron-
bak & Lindroos 2007). We therefore find there is a lack in the literature study-
ing the other branch of the game theoretical behaviour, namely the non-
cooperative or the Nash equilibrium, in a two-species setting. The present paper 
is the first to consider the number of agents that can be sustained in a non-
cooperative equilibrium without driving one stock to extinction. We seek to an-
swer questions as; What are the driving force for species extinction in a two-
species model with biological dependency? The opposite effect of the tragedy 
of the commons is the increased usefulness of a resource as the result of many 
individuals using it. This effect is often referred to as the ‘comedy of the com-
mons (Rose 1986). Does ‘Comedy of the Commons’ occur, and when, in two- 
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species fisheries? An finally most important, what are the ecosystem conse-
quences of economic competition? 
 
Our modeling approach is to consider two species first biologically independent 
species and later biologically dependent species. The case with bilogical inde-
pendent species is determined as a point of reference. We seek the static optim-
al harvesting effort in both cases and apply this as a baseline. In both cases, we 
gradually increase the number of agents until we face the conditions for optimal 
exploitation for a limited number of symmetric competitive exploiters with non-
selective harvesting technology. We relate the optimal competitive effort levels 
to the species biotechnical productivity and contribute to the literature by find-
ing conditions for stability and exploitation of stocks in a two species model 
with biological dependent species, where it is no longer sufficient to apply the 
biotechnical productivity. Our methodology allows us to relate the number of 
competitive exploiters to the extinction of the species. We illustrate our results 
in a simulation model. 
 
In Section 2, we introduce the model by identifying a single stock and several 
exploiters. In Section 3, we have a two-species fishery with 2 countries exploit-
ing these biological independent species. In section 4 set up the model with 
two-species fishery with 2 countries exploiting biological dependent species. In 
section 5 we simulate the analytical results from section 4. Finally, Section 6 
concludes and discusses future research issues. 
2.  Basic one stock model 
Consider a game between n agents harvesting a common natural resource, x 
(Mesterton-Gibbons 2000). Assume equilibrium use of the fish stock over time 
by these agents: 
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1




i h x F
dt
dx . (1) 
  
7
The growth function is explicitly formulated as logistic growth: 
 
  ) / 1 ( ) ( K x Rx x F − = . (2) 
 
Here R is the intrinsic growth rate of fish and K is the carrying capacity of the 
single stock in the ecosystem. The production function is assumed bi-linear in 
effort, E and stock:
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Where q is the catchability coefficient. It follows from (1) - (3) that the equilib-
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Hence, the equilibrium stock decreases linearly in total effort. 
 
If players adapt a traditional non-cooperative Nash game approach when deter-
mining their effort this corresponds to common pool exploitation, or a restricted 
open access, since the exploiters only consider finding a strategy combination 
from which no player has a unilateral incentives to depart (Mesterton-Gibbons 
1993).  The result is kind of a restricted tragedy of the commons (Hardin 
1968),
2 with over-exploitation and partly dissipation of rents since players only 
consider own incentives and not the joint incentives.  
 
If extinction of the species should occur, the biomass should be lower than 
some threshold. With a logistic growth function there is no positive threshold 
                                                            
1   We have assumed a simple Schaefer production function, a more advanced production func-
tion, for example a Cobb-Douglas production function, would complicatematters, and we 
would not be able to find analystical results. 
2   If the number of players where infinite we would have the tragedy of the commons (Mesteton-
Gibbons 1993).  
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and the critical depensation is zero. It would then be the case that extinction oc-
cur when the total effort exceeds the biotechnical productivity,  q R/ . 
 
3.  Multiple independent stocks 
To examine the consequences of more players exploiting two biological inde-
pendent stock, we start out by defining and solving for the solve owner solu-
tion. We then gradually increases the number of players to two, and then to n.   
3.1.  Sole owner optimum w/ two species 
Let us consider two biologically independent species x1 and x2 each following a 
logistic growth function as described in (2). We then assume a sole owner har-
vesting, the two stocks with no possibilities for selectivity, thus the same effort 
reduces both stocks, which is reflected by identical catchability coefficient for 
the stocks.














K x − =  (5b) 
 
where the sub-script is an indicator for the species. 
 
The optimal fishing effort for the sole owner is derived from the following ob-
jective function: 
 
                                                            
3   One could also assume different catchability coefficients for the different stocks as long as the 
coefficients are constant over time, we have a joint production This would only require adding 
a subscript on the q’s, but for simplicity this is not done. An extension of the model could be to 
allow for a certain degree of selectivity in the fishery.  
9
  cE qEx p qEx p Max
E − + 2 2 1 1 , (6) 
  s.t. eq. (5a) and (5b) 
 
subject to the stocks being at equilibrium (5). Here p1 is the market price of fish 
stock x1, p2 the market price of fish stock x2 and c is the unit cost of effort.
4 
 
Assuming logistic growth for the two stocks, stocks are in steady state and us-
ing the first order condition (FOC), the optimal fishing effort for a sole owner 






















= . (7) 
 
Reinserting E* into the equilibrium stocks yields the specific steady state stock 
levels. Note that in this model it may be optimal to drive one of the stocks to 
extinctions. This is the case if the optimal effort level exceeds a threshold de-
fined by the biotechnical productivity, which is the ratio of the intrinsic growth 
rate and catchability coefficient,  q R E j / *≥ , j={1,2} (Clark 1990). Since the op-
timal effort is defined by equation (7) extinction is particularly of concern if 
one of the stocks has a low biotechnical productivity and the cost-price ratio of 
other species is sufficiently low (Clark 1990). The optimal effort level is a trade 
off between harvesting the different species and their productivity. If the intrin-
sic growth rate of a species is increased then the optimal effort level is also in-
creased. The trade off occurs when there is an increase in the carrying capacity 
or in the price of one of species. The change in the optimal effort level depends 
on whether the size of the intrinsic growth rate of the species is larger than the 
growth rate of the other species (then effort increases) or lower (then optimal 
effort decreases) (Clark 1990). With two species this is relatively simple to test, 
but with many species the results are more ambiguous. 
 
                                                            
4   We assume exogenously given prices of fish.  
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3.2. The  two-player  equilibrium w/ two independent species 
If there are now two symmetric, competing countries harvesting two common 
species, then country i maximises the following: 
 
  i i i
E
cE x qE p x qE p
i
− + 2 2 1 1 max  , i={1,2}. (8) 
  s.t. (5a) and (5b). 
 
With the logistic growth functions and stocks in steady state, the reaction func-








E E − = . (9) 
 
Rearranging it becomes clear that the two-country equilibrium results in 4/3 
higher effort than the sole owner case, since the equilibrium is: 
 
  k i E E E = = *
3
2 , (10) 
 
Thus total effort, ET=3/4E*. The two-player equilibrium is now generalised into 
n player equilibrium exploiting two biologically independent species. 
3.3.  The n-player equilibrium w/ 2 independent species 
Assume there are n symmetric countries competing for harvest of 2 biologically 
independent species.
5 Each country maximises the following profit function 
subject to the steady state of logistic growth of the stocks. The interdependency 
among fishermen is reflected in the equilibrium of growth functions: 
 
  i i i
E
cE x qE p x qE p
i
− + 2 2 1 1 max  , i={1,2,…,n} (11) 
                                                            
5   The model can straight forward be extended to m species, but we stay with two species for later 
comparison to the biologically dependent species.  
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*  i={1,2,…,n}, k={1,2,…,n}. (12) 
 
Since we know countries are symmetric we can easily solve for the optimal ef-
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n approaching infinity the total fishing effort approaching restricted open access 
effort 2E*. 
 














+ − = ,  j={1,2}. (14) 
 
From this it is seen that stocks might be eliminated if the total effort is too high. 
Since total effort depends on the number of non-cooperative exploiters we can 
find the critical number of players playing a Nash game, which just shifts from 
preserving the biodiversity to eliminating one species. Equalling equation (14) 
to zero for each of the species we find this critical number of players, but start-
ing by minimising the bio-technical productivity (Rj/q for species j={1,2}) we 
can simplify the problem and only consider the number of players for the spe-
cies with the lowest biotechnical productivity (Clark 1990). In our model, 
where there is no selectivity, illustrated by the same catchability for all species,  
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it is therefore sufficient to find the species with the lowest intrinsic growth rate. 
In addition Clark (1990) shows that this species will only be eliminated if the 
cost-price ratio for other species in question is sufficiently low. Thus for elimi-
nation of one species to occur, we need to find the stock with the lowest bio-
technical productivity, call that stock l. This stock will only face elimination if 
















for j,l={1,2}. (15) 
 
If for example stock 1 has the lowest biotechnical productivity ( q R q R 2 1 < ) 













Only if the above equation is satisfied will one of the stocks be extinct. Thus, 
equation (15) is a necessary condition for extinction to occur. If equation (15) is 
not satisfied there is no critical limit on the number of players exploiting the 
two stocks in the aspect of preserving the ecosystem, and it must be assumed 
that this will result in a restricted open access exploitation of the stocks. If 
equation (15) is satisfied, then the critical number of players defined by equa-
tion (14) equal to zero. If equation (15) is satisfied, then extinction will occur 
for the stock with lowest biotechnical productivity when the number of non-











* , (16) 
 
where l is the stock with lowest bio-technical productivity. 
 
n* is now defined as the limit of non-cooperative exploiters where we will shift 
from preserving to non-preserving biodiversity. For a number of players ex-
                                                            
6   This is simply a rewritten version of Clarks two- condition for a species to be extinct (Clark 
1990, p. 315).  
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ceeding n* not all species in the ecosystem will be sustained, e.g. equation (15) 
is satisfied such that the species with lowest biotechnical productivity will be 
extinct . Seemingly, the independency of the stocks implies that it is sufficient 
to consider the single species independently with regard to the critical number. 
There is, however, implicitly economic interdependence among the species be-
cause of the lack of selectivity. This interdependency is reflected in the optimal 
effort level being dependent on all intrinsic growth rates and carrying capacities 
for all species in the multispecies fishery. Thus the optimal effort level E* is 
dependent of the carrying capacity and the intrinsic growth rate of all the spe-
cies in this multispecies fishery.  
 
We now proceeds towards finding analytical characteristics of n* for biological 
dependent species. 
4.  Multiple biological dependent stocks 
4.1.  Two biological dependent stocks  
In many fisheries there is not only an economic interdependence between 
stocks but also a biological interdependency among stocks. Biological interde-
pendency may have different stature; It may be predator-prey relationship as, 
such as the seals feeding on smaller pelagic fish, it may be a prey-prey relation-
ship e.g. the cod feeding on sprat and the sprat feeding on cod eggs in the Baltic 
Sea or it may be symbiosis or mutualism which has a particular importance in 
tropical reef environment, such as cleaner fish and their mutualism with other 
species.  
 
We consider a static game between n agents harvesting common natural re-
sources (see also Mesterton-Gibbons 2000). Assume equilibrium use of the two 
fish stocks by symmetric countries: 
 
  0 ) , (
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ix qE x x G
dt
dx . (17b) 
 
The growth functions include interaction between species and are explicitly 
formulated as a variation of the competition model originally suggested by 
Gause (see Clark 1990). These growth functions can be regarded as variations 
of the traditional logistic growth functions: 
 
  2 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 ) / 1 ( ) , ( x x K x x R x x F θ − − =  (18a) 
  2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 ) / 1 ( ) , ( x x K x x R x x G θ − − = . (18b) 
 
The parameters θi i={1,2} are referred to as the interdependency parameter be-
tween species and can be positive or negative constants. If they are both posi-
tive they describe the biological competition between the stocks, if they are 
both negative they describe a biological symbiosis between stocks and finally, 
if they have different signs they describe predator-prey relation ship, where the 
constant with the negative sign represent the predator.  In some cases, the na-
ture in itself is so favourable that exploitation, in this model, cannot eliminate 
any of the species. In other cases the nature itself will lead to elimination of one 
of the species. Obviously, we are only interested in the cases, where the nature 
itself does not eliminate a species, therefore we implicitly assume, that both 
stocks are positive in the natural equilibrium. If this is not true, it is not mean-
ingful to find the critical number of players. 
 
A main critique of the applied model in equation (18) is that the growth model 
applied results in a linear functional response; this means that the consumption 
per capita increases linearly. There exists other models for multispecies growths 
and consumption (see Noy-Meir 1975 for a description of some of these mod-
els), but they lack the modelling advantages of the one we suggest. A variation 
of this type of model is also applied in Hannesson (1983) and in the theoretical 
paper by Mesterton-Gibbon (1988). 
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It follows from the above model that the following two equations jointly de-
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describes the total effort by all exploiters: 
 
  () 2 1 1
1
1
1 x qE R
R
K
x T θ − − =  (19a) 
  () 1 2 2
2
2
2 x qE R
R
K
x T θ − − = . (19b) 
 
Inserting equation (19b) in equation (19a) and solving for x1 yields equilibrium 
stock species 1. Inserting this equilibrium stock for species 1 in equation (19b) 
yields the equilibrium stock for species 2. The two equilibrium of the stocks 
depending on applied effort are defined as: 
 
  () ()
2 1 2 1 2 1
1 2 2 1 2 2 2 1 1
1 θ θ
θ θ
K K R R




− + + −
=  (20a) 
  () ()
2 1 2 1 2 1
2 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 2
2 θ θ
θ θ
K K R R




− + + −
= . (20b) 
 
We see from equation (20a) and (20b) that we can no longer, as the case with 
biological independent species, be certain that an increase in the total effort 
level reduces the equilibrium stocks. Whether an increase in total effort in-
creases or decreases the equilibrium stocks depends how the biological parame-
ters are in relation to each other. The following exemplifies this for species 1:
7 
 
 -  If  [] [ ] 2 1 2 1 2 1 1 2 2 θ θ θ K K R R Sign K R Sign + − ≠ − , which is always the case in a 
predator-prey model, where species 1 is the predator, but could also oc-
cur for competition and mutualism, then we have a case, where the equi-
librium biomass of species 1 diminish with an increase in effort.  
 
                                                            
7   One can reach the same conclusions for species 2, simply by switching the subscripts 1 and 2.  
16
  -  If on the other hand [] [ ] 2 1 2 1 2 1 1 2 2 θ θ θ K K R R Sign K R Sign + − = − , which could be a 
predator-prey case, where species 1 is the prey, or in a competition or 
mutualism model, we have a case, where the equilibrium biomass for 
species 1 increases with the effort. This means that the fishing pressure 
has less impact on the species compared to the ecological pressure due to 
the biological interdependency.  
 
We can conclude that with biological interdependence among species an effort 
increase in the fishery is by itself not sufficient to say whether the equilibrium 
stock will increase or decrease since the ecological pressure from the interde-
pendence also has an effect.  
4.2.  Two biological dependent stocks w/ sole owner 
The sole owner optimum effort with interacting species is defined by the equi-
librium yields (equations 19a+b) and then maximising the economic benefits 
from a single effort level (equation 11 with new steady state conditions). The 
solution to the problem yields: 
 
  () ( ) ()
() () () 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 2 1 1
2
2 1 2 2 1 2 1 2 2 1 1 1 2 1 2 2 2 1 2 1 2 1 *
2 θ θ
θ θ θ θ
K R p p K K R p K q
R p K R p K R R p K R R p K q K K R R c
E
− + − +
− − + + + −
= . (21) 
 
This solution corresponds to the solution in equation (7) if θ1=θ2=0. Whether 
the optimal effort in a dependent two-species setting is higher or lower than the 
baseline in (7) depends on the sign of the interdependency. 
 
For illustrative purposes we have set up a numerical example comparing the ef-
fort level when species are independent and dependent, respectively. This cor-
responds to comparing equation (7) and equation (21). For the illustrative pur-
pose following parameter values are applied:  
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Table 1.  Parameter values applied for simulation 
 
p1  p2  Rlow  Rhigh  K1= K2  c q  θ1  θ2 
1 2  0.3  0.9  50  7 0.5  [-0.2;0.2]  [-0.2;0.2] 
 






  Optimal effort when species are dependent is larger 
  Optimal effort when species are independent is larger 
 
From figure 1 we notice that the optimal effort in the case of a competition 
(predator, predator) among species will be larger when species are dependent 
than when they are independent. This is caused by the harvest taking some of 
the pressure away from the species, this pressure does not occur when species 
are independent. When there is a mutualism among species, then the optimal ef-
fort will be larger when species are independent and the mutualism does not ex-
ist compared to the case when species are dependent. In the case of predator-
prey it is harder to say which optimal effort level is the largest. In these cases it 
depends on the relative price and the growth of the two species. In the lower left 
corner we have the largest optimal effort when species are independent. This is 






























prey, this is intuitively clear from the fact that the ‘prey-pressure’ is not avail-
able in the independent case, and therefore the optimal effort can be higher in 
this case. 
4.3.  Two biological dependent stocks w/ n players 
With n symmetric players the problem is similar to the case with independent 
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The critical number of players where one of the stocks is eliminated is defined 
by setting equation (22a) or (22b) equal to zero and solve for n.  It is, however, 
not always the case, that there exist such a critical number of players that will 
eliminate one of the stocks. Since solving this might result in negative n or in 
n’s where the stock would actually benefit from more players – the ‘comedy of 
the commons’. The critical number of number of players, which is the knife 
edge for eliminating or no eliminating one species, exist if under open access 
one of the species is eliminated, and if a natural equilibrium exists. If a critical 
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, j,w={1,2},  j w ≠ . (23) 
 
Define  j j n n min min =  and  j j
n n max max =  and let n* be the critical number of non-
cooperative players exploiting two biological dependent species that will no 
longer be able to sustain the ecosystem. n* is then the variable we are seeking. 
The question is whether a stable or an unstable equilibrium of harvesting the 
stocks exists. If the equilibrium is stable for a single stock j, then an increment 
in the number of players compared to nj, will decrease the stock size for stock j. 
On the other hand, if this is not true for one or more of the stocks then the sta-
bility of the equilibrium is more complicated.  
 
To understand the logic intuition behind stocks growing with the pressure from 
fishery, and thus a higher critical number of players, one needs to remember the 
multispecies setting. Imagine species 1 being a prey, it faces a large biological 
pressure from species 2 (for our model this occurs when θ1 is very large and/or 
the biomass of stock 2 is very large). A non-selective harvest takes out harvest 
from both species, but the reduction in the stock 2 reduces the pressure on stock 
1 and this pressure reduction is numerically larger than the pressure from the 
exploiters. Mathematically this will occur when:  
 
  w j
n
i
i x E q θ < ∑
=1
 for  0 > j θ .   (24) 
 
When inequality (24) is satisfied the ‘Tragedy of the Commons’ does no longer 
occur, we are instead facing a ‘Comedy of the Commons’.  
 
Based on the stability issue, several conditions are needed to define n*. These 
conditions correspond to equation (15) but are fare more complicated due to the 
biological interdependence. The conditions are: 
 
1. If  0 min < n  and  ()() max 1 min 1 n x n x >  and  ( ) ( ) max 2 min 2 n x n x >  then  0 *= n .  
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 A natural biological equilibrium with positive stocks does not exists, 
since at n*=0 one of the stocks mathematically is negative, which is inter-
preted as an elimination of that stock.  
2. If  0 min ≥ n  and  ()() max 1 min 1 n x n x >  and  ( ) ( ) max 2 min 2 n x n x >  then  min * n n = . 
  This is a traditional case, where a natural equilibrium exists and more 
players result in lower stocks for both species. n* represents a stable equi-
librium and determines the number of players that exactly extinct one of 
the stocks. 
 
The following two conditions apply for both  0 min ≥ n  or  0 min < n : 
 
3. If  ()() max 1 min 1 n x n x <  and  () ( ) max 2 min 2 n x n x <  then n*=restricted open access or 0. 
  The stocks will, due to their biological conditions, grow with the pressure 
from fishery. The players will be attracted to the fishery
8 until we end 
with restricted open access equilibrium. At the restricted open access 
equilibrium, it should be tested whether both stocks are positive. If not, no 
one can exploit the stocks in a profitable way and the critical number of 
players is zero.  
4. If  () () max min n x n x j j <  and  () ( ) max min n x n x w w >   j w ≠ : 
  One stock (j) grows with the pressure from the fishery while the other 
stock (w) is redueced with the pressure form the fishery. 
 
a.  If  0 min > = w n n  then n*=nmin: 
   The  stock  w is at zero for nmin and an increase in the critical number 
then stock w will be eliminated, therefore  n*=nmin. The derived criti-
cal value results in a stable steady state. 
b.  If  0 min < = w n n  then n*=0: 
   The  stock  w is at zero for nmin and an increment in n would eliminate 
stock w.  Since the critical number is negative this means no one at all 
can exploit the stock, thus no natural equilibrium exists. 
                                                            
8   This implicitly assumes a positive profit is possible for a sole owner.  
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c.  If  j n n = min  then n*=nmax or 0: 
   Stock  j is zero for nmin, but this stock gain from the fishing pressure, 
therefore n*=nmax if  0 max ≥ n . The original derived equilibrium (nmin) is 
an unstable steady state, but stability will be accessed at a higher level 
of players (nmax). If  0 max < n then  n*=0 since the natural equilibrium 
does not exist.  
 
The biological interdependency of the species creates more complexity when 
determining sustainability of the ecosystem for the species. An additional di-
mension is added as the tragedy of the commons does not always occur. The 
bio-technical productivity is no longer in itself sufficient to consider for finding 
the critical number. Equation (23) including condition 1-4 is an extension of 
equations (15) and (16) since it also includes the interrelations between the spe-
cies. If the interrelations are zero (θj=0), equations (15) and (16) are in them-
selves sufficient. 
 
The critical number in equation (23) depends on several economic parameters 
through the optimal baseline effort (E*). Appendix A analyses the effects on 
how this optimal baseline effort changes when economic parameters are 
changed and how the critical number of players changes if optimal effort level 
is changed. Based on this analysis it is difficult to say anything concrete on 
what happens to the critical number unless since it depends highly on balance 
between the prices, intrinsic growths, the carrying capacities and the interde-
pendency among species.   
22
5.  Simulations 
To get a better understanding of the analytical results in section 4, and to elabo-
rate particular on the case with biological dependency we simulate exploitation 
of two stocks with biological dependency. We define two stocks with identical 
carrying capacity, the intrinsic growth rate of the two stocks can be high or low, 
one stock has a higher economic price than the other. This gives four cases to 
consider: 
 
Case 1:   Both stocks having low intrinsic growth rate. 
Case 2:   Both stocks having a high intrinsic growth rate. 
Case 3:   Low valued stock has a low intrinsic growth rate, 
  high value stock has a high intrinsic growth rate. 
Case 4:   Low valued stock has a high intrinsic growth rate,  
  high value stock has a low intrinsic growth rate. 
 
Within each case we allow for predator-prey, competition and mutualism, as we 
let the interdependency parameter (θ) vary between positive and negative for 
both species. 
 
We simulate the natural equilibrium and the critical number of non-cooperative 
players where extinction of one species occur for different biological depend-
ence. The biological interdependence is varied in model, and results will be rep-
resented for all combinations of dependency in the range. The applied parame-
ters are represented in table 2. 
 
Table 2.  Parameter values applied for simulation 
 
p1  p2  Rlow  Rhigh  K1= K2 c q OA MS  θ1  θ2 
1  2  0.3 0.9 50  7  0.5  60  60  [-0.2;0.2]  [-0.2;0.2] 
 
We have defined an upper limit of players which we refer to as restricted open 
access (OA) and an upper limit for the stock, a maximum stock size (MS). This  
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is purely for illustrative purposes since some conditions are so favourable that 
we have a case of the comedy of the commons or a case with symbiosis, where 
stocks will jointly grow unlimited. 
5.1. Natural  equilibria 
We start out by simulating the natural equilibria for different interdependency 
among species, to identify where the two species can coexist. If the species 
cannot coexist, we do not have a natural equilibria and it is not relevant to 
search for a places where one species is extinct.  We are simulating the natural 
equilibria for all the different cases.
9 Figure 2.a illustrates the patterns for natu-
ral equilibrium for both species with a low intrinsic growth rate (case 1) as 
function of interdependency among species. Appendix B includes the natural 
equilibria for other cases. 
 
                                                            
9   The stocks are symmetric, therefore (low, high) is equivalent to (high, low) for the natural equi-
libria. The later model includes economic parameters, and since the species a valued differently 
and (low, high) and (high, low) are no longer equivalent.  
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Figure 2.a.  The natural equilibria for two stocks both with a low intrinsic 










































All figures for the natural equilibria (figure 2.a and figures B.1 and B.2 in ap-
pendix B) look very much alike. In the symbiotic case (θ1, θ2<0) both stocks are 
above their carrying capacities since they both benefit from other species exis-
tence. These upper plateaus when there is a symbiosis (or mutualism) among 
species are higher than the carrying capacities due to the upper limit for maxi-
mum stock size (MS), which we forced into being slightly higher than the car-
rying capacity. The theoretical model itself, suggests that the stock could jointly 
grow to very high stock levels.
10 In the case of predator-prey situations (θj>0 
(prey),  θw<0 (predator)), the dominant cases in the figures are the cases in 
which one of the stocks becomes extinct. However, there is a narrow parameter 
space at the positive θ-parameter (the prey) close to zero, where both species 
                                                            
10   The reason for this is the linearly increase in the per capita consumption (mutualism) with the 
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can coexist. Finally, the case of competition (θ1, θ2>0) is described by decreas-
ing stock levels e.g. species 1 decreased with increasing θ1 and species 2 de-
creases with increasing θ2. Our conclusion based on these simulation results are 
that the general pattern for the coexistence of species does not change with the 
change in intrinsic growth, what changes is the magnitude of the contours. 
5.2. Species  preservation and number of non-cooperative exploiters 
This section illustrates the results of the simulation model. The results are pre-
sented as three-dimensional figures that describe the critical numbers of players 
in a non-cooperative exploitation of two stocks where one of the stocks is 
eliminated (n*) on one axis and the two interdependence parameters (θ1 and θ2) 
on the other two axes. In the cases, where the natural equilibrium itself elimi-
nates one of the stocks, the number of players is zero. The number of players is 
derived based on equation (29) and on the conditions 1-4, and is illustrated for a 
range of interaction (competition, predator-prey and symbiosis) among the two 
species. Again, it is important to realise, that we have set an upper limit of 60 
players which in our simulation represents a restricted open access.
11 It is not 
the case, that the restricted open access equilibrium crashes the ecosystem, it is 
merely assumed that in a rational static bio-economic model, there is no reason 
to look for players above the restricted open access.   
 
 
                                                            
11   We have for illustration purposes set this limit, otherwise, the scale on the ncrit axis would be 
too large to present anything meaningful.  
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Figure 3.a.  Critical number of players, where the ecosystem cannot be sus-





















Note: ncrit is identical to n* in the theoretical model. 
 
The upper plateaus in figure 3.a and also in the figures 3.b-3.d represent the re-
stricted open access equilibrium, where both species will coexist with the high 
number of non-cooperative exploiters. For all cases the symbiosis always leads 
to an upper plateau. Figure 3.a shows that there are only limited areas, where 
extinction of species will occur due to the number of players. These areas are 
concentrated in the predator-prey models, and correspond to the areas between 
the upper (restricted open access) plateaus and the lower (no natural equilibria) 
plateaus. For a symbiosis among species, it is not surprising that, if eco-system 
can sustain interaction if species are independent, then a symbiosis can also sus-
tain a restricted open access. In the case of competition among species, the eco-
system can to some extent sustain a restricted open access but if the competition 








Figure 3.b.  Critical number of players, where the ecosystem cannot be sus-
























Note: ncrit is identical to n* in the theoretical model. 
 
In figure 3.b, where both stocks have a high growth, the overall conclusions are 
more or less the same as the conclusions from figure 3.a. The are, however, two 
main differences between them; first; the case with higher intrinsic growth (fig-
ure 3.b) can, in the competition case, better sustain the restricted open access 
situation (the size of the upper plateau in the competition area is larger) and 
second; in predator-prey case higher predation by the high-valued species can 
sustain more players in the equilibrium (the rainbow coloured area is prolonged 
into the predator-prey square).  
 
The following two figures (figure 3.c and 3.d) compare the cases with different 
growth rates and different price for the two stocks (case 2 and case 4). 






Figure 3.c.  Critical number of players, where the ecosystem cannot be sus-





























Figure 3.d.  Critical number of players, where the ecosystem cannot be sus-





















Note: ncrit is identical to n* in the theoretical model. 
 
The cases in figure 3.c and 3.d are fairly complicated with plateaus, peaks and 
canyons appearing in many places. This shows that small changes in the eco-
system parameters can have a significant economic effect: a system previously 
able to sustain several fishers may suddenly be able to sustain only a few fishers 
or none at all. It is, however, still the case that the symbiotic interaction can sus-
tain even restricted open access and the same is true for some parameters in the 
competition square. 
6.  Discussion and Conclusion 
The paper merges the bio-economic multispecies modelling with the non-








haviour for non-cooperative exploiters harvesting biological dependent and in-
dependent multispecies in a non-selective manner is set up. In this setup we 
have analytically defined the conditions for species preservation when non-
cooperative exploiters harvest in the multi-species fisheries, with is a contribu-
tion to the literature for multispecies, where the bio-technical productivity is not 
sufficient. In this context, it is important to notice that we set up a simple non-
spatial model, and in a spatial setting, like the natural environment, the different 
patches are likely to have different characteristics’ and therefore different spe-
cies may survive in different patches. 
 
When species are biological independent it is sufficient to consider the bio-
technical productivity to find the stock which is in danger of not being pre-
served. When species are biological dependent it is not straight forward to ap-
ply the biotechnical productivity from the independent model. The conditions, 
for which the stock is in danger of not being preserved, are far more compli-
cated and requires also including the interdependency parameters. We contrib-
ute to the literature with a general definition of the critical number of non-
cooperative players to preserve biodiversity in a multispecies fishery for all 
possible set of interdependency parameters.  
 
We have in our analytical model with biological dependent species shown that 
the ‘Tragedy of the Commons’ does not apply for some parameters, but instead 
we have the ‘Comedy of the Commons’ where restricted open access is favour-
able. 
 
Applying the results from the analytical model, we simulated a multi-species 
fishery with two dependent species. We experienced that the natural equilib-
rium looks more or less the same for different intrinsic growth rates. We also 
found the obvious result that if independent stocks can sustain a restricted open 




Among other lessons to be learned from the simulations are that it is primarily 
the low values of interdependency parameters with are the interesting values, 
but in that parameter range the model is very sensitive to small changes in those 
small dependency values. A small change in the interdependency can lead to 
big changes in the critical number of non-cooperative players.  
 
Finally, the when there is competition among species a higher intrinsic growth 
rate tend to extend the range of parameters for which restricted open access is 
sustained. 
 
Among areas for further research are simulations of cases where a two-species 
fishery with biological independent stocks has a limited number of players 
which can preserve the biodiversity. It is expected, that such a simulation ex-
ample could give more information about the critical number function for small 
values of dependency.  
 
The biological independent case is straight forward to extend to more than two 
species, but the biological dependent species requires more considerations for 
the interactions for the species. We believe that it is a possible research issue, 
but it would require a researcher with a lot of courage.  
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Appendix A.  Sensitivity analysis when changing eco-
nomic parameters 
Section 4.3 investigates the conditions for the number of non-cooperative play-
ers that can preserve the two species in the eco-system. This appendix conducts 
a sensitivity analysis on the baseline optimal effort when changes in the eco-
nomic parameters occur. Further the impact on the baseline effort on the num-
ber of players is analysed. Together this results in a sensitivity analysis on the 
critical number of players when economic parameters are changed.    
 
Optimal effort and price of species 
If the price of species increases, then the change in the optimal baseline effort, 
and thereby also effort for non-cooperative players, will look like: 
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To find the effects on the optimal effort level in the case of an increase in the 
price of one species it is necessary to figure out whether (25a) and (25b) are 
positive or negative. 
 
It is clear that the denominator,  ( ) ( ) ( )
2
1 2 2 1 2 2 2 1 1 2 2
2 2 θ θ K R p p K K R p K q − + − + , will al-
ways be positive because of the second power, the nominator, 
() () () ( ) 2 1 2 1 2 1 1 2 1 2 2 2 1 θ θ θ K K R R c R R q p K cR K − − − + , is, however more ambiguous.  The 
following focuses on the sign of the nominator: 
 
If  () () [] [ ] 2 1 2 1 2 1 1 2 1 2 2 2 θ θ θ K K R R Sign c R R q p K cR Sign − = − − +  then an increase in price in-
creases effort.    
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In the case of a predator-prey model θ1 and θ2 will have different signs and 
therefore the last term will be positive. 
 
A sufficient but not necessary assumption for the effort to increase as a result of 
a price change for one of the species is then that the growth of the species, 
which experience the price change, is larger than the growth of the other spe-
cies. For a price change for species 1, this will look like  2 1 R R >   and that 
() 1 2 1 2 θ c R R q p ≥ − . This is more likely to be true if the intrinsic growth of species 1 
is relative high to species 2 and if species one is the predator (θ1<0). It is thus 
seen that for the effort to increase, it is a balance between the value of the two 
species, their intrinsic growths and their interdependency. 
 
Optimal effort and cost of harvesting 
If the cost of harvesting is changed, then the effort is changed according to fol-
lowing: 
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One would expect this to be negative, such that the effort is decreased if the 
cost of harvesting is increased, ceteris paribus. But for this to be true either 
2 1 2 1 2 1 θ θ K K R R >  or  ( ) () 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 θ θ K R p p K K R p K − + − < . 
 
Conclusion on changes in effort, when economic parameters are changed 
It is difficult to say anything concrete on what happens to the optimal effort 
level if the economic parameters changes. It is a balance between the prices, in-
trinsic growths, the carrying capacities and the interdependency among species. 
It can, however, be concluded, that economic parameters will, except in rare 




Critical number of players and effort level 
We know from above analysis that changes in economic parameters make E* 
change, and this is true without changing other parameters in the critical num-
ber of players. Changes in optimal effort can therefore be interpreted as an ef-
fect of economic parameter changes.  
 
If the optimal effort level in the sole owner case increases, then the number of 
players to sustain the bio-diversity is changes according to the following: 
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The denominators in equation (27a) and (27b) are positive, but in order to dis-
cuss the sign of the nominator we divide into different subcategories of interde-
pendency. 
 
If θ1, θ2 <0: (symbiosis) 
The nominators in equation (27a) and (27b) are negative and the critical number 
of players will decrease if the optimal effort level is increased. 
 
If θ1, θ2 >0: (competition) 
Then the number of players will decrease only if: 
1 2 2 θ K R <  and  1 2 1 θ K R <  or  1 2 2 θ K R >  and  1 2 1 θ K R >  if species 1 is binding for the 
critical number or  2 1 1 θ K R <  and  2 1 2 θ K R <  or  2 1 1 θ K R >  and  2 1 2 θ K R >  if species 2 is 
binding for the critical number. 
 
This can be interpreted as the intrinsic growth rates of both species either have 
to be sufficiently large or sufficiently small otherwise the competition in the 
model will drive the stocks to extinction. 
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If θ1 <0 (predator) and θ2 >0 (prey) (or θ2 <0 (predator) and θ1 >0 (prey)): 
(predator-prey model) 
If the predator sets the limits for the critical number of players then an increase 
in the optimal effort will further decrease the critical number of players.  
 
If on the other hand the prey sets the limit for the critical number of players 
then this number will only decrease if  2 1 1 θ K R <  and  2 1 2 θ K R <  or vice versa. This 
means that the increase in effort is only critical if the intrinsic growths of the 
two species are low.   
 
That is if the intrinsic growth rate of the prey is small then the intrinsic growth 
of the prey must also be small and vice versa if the number of players should 
increase with the optimal effort level.   
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Appendix B.  Natural equilibria for two biological de-
pendent stocks 
Figure B.1.  The natural equilibria for two stocks both with a high intrinsic 










































Figure B.2.  The natural equilibria for two stocks both with a low and high 
intrinsic growth rate, respectively (case ) 
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